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This paper examines voluntary disclosure in the annual reports
of financially distressed companies in Indonesia. The disclosure
score range is between 3 percent and 49 percent with the mean and
median score of 25 percent and 26 percent, respectively, at the onset
of distress. The score is measured as the ratio of the total items
disclosed to the maximum possible items score applicable to the firm.
The most disclosed items are in the category of financial highlights
and general corporate information whereas the three least disclosed
items concern projections, liquidity, and research and development.
Moreover, the results of this study reveal that the level of voluntary
disclosure in the financially distressed firms is higher than that in
non-financially distressed firms. There is no significant difference
between the types of information disclosed by the 2 groups. The
statistical tests are applied for various years. Consistent with find-
ings in previous studies, the size of the firm appears to be a positive
variable significantly affecting the disclosure level.
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Introduction
In 1997, the Asian crisis hit Indo-
nesia and caused a huge number of
business failures. In addition, 117 sys-
temic banking crises have occurred in
93 countries around the world since
the late 1970s and the costs of corpo-
rate restructuring reached billions of
U.S. dollars for these countries (Ramos
1999; Caprio and Klingebiel 1999).
Many studies referred to weak
corporate governance as a factor which
may have worsened the Indonesian
economy during the crisis (Husnan
2001; Claessens et al.1999; Claessens
et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; Obata
2001). Disclosure is closely related to
good corporate governance practice.
By applying corporate transparency,
information asymmetry can be re-
duced, hence minimizing the negative
consequences of adverse selection and
moral hazard problems (Utama 2003).
Consequently, higher disclosure may
reduce related costs in the period of
financial distress. Predicated upon the
aforementioned context, this study at-
tempts to identify an important issue to
examine whether troubled firms in In-
donesia make voluntary disclosures.
The objectives of this paper are to
explore (1) the extent to which finan-
cially distressed firms in Indonesia
make voluntary disclosures by pro-
ducing voluntary disclosure score, (2)
the types of information or items that
they disclose voluntarily in annual re-
ports, (3) the comparison of types and
level of voluntary disclosure between
financially distressed and non-finan-
cially distressed firms, and (4) the fac-
tors influencing the degree of volun-
tary disclosure in Indonesia.
This study purports to give a sig-
nificant contribution to accounting
knowledge by offering a comprehen-
sive list to measure the voluntary dis-
closure level of financially distressed
firms in Indonesia and reveals the ex-
tent of the disclosure. This paper also
provides a comparison of the types of
information categories disclosed by
distressed and control firms. Most
importantly, it demonstrates that the
level of voluntary disclosure in finan-
cially distressed firms is higher than
that in non-financially distressed firms.
It also demonstrates that financial dis-
tress and size contribute positively to
the level of firms’ voluntary disclo-
sure.
Brief Literature Review
There are some studies exploring
disclosures in troubled firms (Frost
1997; Webb 2002, among others). Frost
takes a sample of U.K. firms which
received first time modified audit re-
ports and were experiencing financial
difficulties while Webb examines U.S.
firms making voluntary disclosures in
the Management’s Discussion and
Analysis (hereafter, MDA) section of
the Annual Reports of firms with an
Altman’s Z-score in the bankruptcy
prediction region (1.20 or lower). How-
ever, none of the disclosure studies
takes a sample of Indonesian finan-
cially distressed firms. Prior studies of
disclosure in Indonesia did not specify
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whether or not their samples were fi-
nancially distressed (Susanto 1992;
Utama 2003).
Several empirical studies have
examined the voluntary disclosures in
annual reports within national settings.
The studies were in New Zealand
(Hossain et al. 1995), Sweden (Cooke
1989), Japan (Cooke 1991), Mexico
(Chow and Wong-Boren 1987), the
U.K. and the U.S. (Gray et al. 1995).
Using Indonesian samples, Susanto
(1992) investigates the extent of cor-
porate disclosure in annual reports of
companies listed on the JSX. The con-
clusions of his study are as follows.
First, the level of voluntary disclosure
is greater for foreign-based companies
than for their domestic counterparts.
Second, the degree of disclosure is
greater for companies listed on the
JSX before the enactment of new regu-
lations of 1987 than for those listed
after this date. Third, the extent of the
disclosure is not associated with the
degree of foreign ownership restric-
tion.
Utama (2003) referred to the study
conducted by Gunawan (2000) which
replicated the scoring method proposed
by Botosan (1997). The method was
developed for measuring the amount
of voluntary information in the United
States manufacturing samples in 1990.
Consequently, the score contains not
only a list of voluntary information
disclosed in the annual reports of pub-
lic listed companies in Indonesia but
also the mandatory information, since
the disclosure regulations of the coun-
tries are different. For example, a brief
history of company is voluntary under
U.S. regulations (Gray et al. 1995) but
it is mandatory under Indonesian Capi-
tal Market Supervisory Agency regu-
lations.
Hypothesis Development
Voluntary Disclosure and
Financial Distress
Financial distress increases mar-
ket uncertainty since the circumstances
are often more complicated than nor-
mal condition (Opler and Titman
1994). Moreover, poor governance in
Indonesian banking systems provides
a natural setting for high information
asymmetry between bank creditors and
borrowers. Several issues suggest that
most Indonesian banks are better clas-
sified as connection lending banks
rather than as relationship banking.
The Indonesian government regula-
tion in October 1988 provided for a
rapid domestic bank growth without
adequate controlling and management
systems. During this period, the banks
competed to attract customers both for
lending and funding and this has also
impacted on banking officer turnover
and quality. With inadequately quali-
fied banking officers and a poor credit
monitoring system, most banks granted
loans on a collateral basis. In extreme
cases, the bank did not carefully check
the condition of pledged assets. Sheer
competition among banks made offic-
ers decide to grant credit mostly on the
basis of asset documentation of the
collateral.
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An extensive theoretical literature
shows that collateral can mitigate moral
hazard and adverse selection problems
in loan contracting (Chan and Thakor
1987; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). How-
ever, Rajan and Winton (1995) sug-
gest that collateral is likely to be effec-
tive only if its value can be monitored.
Poor collateral monitoring systems,
especially after granting loans, poor
borrower’s information and record
systems, inferior officer quality and
weak control of credit systems fre-
quently impaired the Indonesian bank-
ing industry. In this case, collateral
base lending does not give benefit in
monitoring credit. Husnan (2001)
states, “the deregulation of banking
industry and the liberalization of capi-
tal account [in Indonesia] created a
variety of new sources of financing for
the corporate sector. However, the
banking system proved incapable of
performing its intermediation function.
Because regulation was weak, banks
could earn profits even when they did
not gather and process information
about risk.”
Thus, Indonesian banks do not
have good reputation in managing cli-
ent information; managers of distressed
firms therefore have an incentive to
disclose more through various infor-
mation venues in an effort to convince
creditors of their chance of eventual
survival. The most reliable informa-
tion of future cash flows can be ob-
tained from the managers of firms.
Managers generally have better infor-
mation about the firm’s internal opera-
tions than do outside investors, but
they may lack the incentives to make
the best use of this information (Wruck
1990). At this stage, creditors and
shareholders might be more aware of
the quality of disclosure provided by
financially distressed firms to assist
them in making crucial decisions.
Trueman (1986) suggests that manag-
ers should use voluntary disclosure to
generate a signal about their manage-
ment skills in assisting distressed firms
out of financial difficulty.
 Further, previous studies suggest
comprehensive organizational changes,
governance and structure often accom-
panying financial distress. These re-
structuring activities benefit firms
which increase the level of disclosure.
Healy et al. (1995) find that manage-
ment changes, major business restruc-
turing, and access to capital markets
are associated with improved disclo-
sure. In other words, being financially
distressed creates value by improving
the transparency of the firm. One of
the possible explanations is as fol-
lows: financial distress increases con-
flicts among the stakeholders. The
conflicts lead to complex information
and inference problems for
claimholders trying to value a dis-
tressed firm. In order to meet their
needs, management has an incentive
to disclose more. In addition, given the
risk of job loss accompanying poor
earnings performance in the time of
financial distress, managers may try to
elaborate on their performance by in-
creasing corporate disclosure. Based
on these arguments, a hypothesis can
be formed.
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H
1 
: The level of voluntary disclosure
in financially distressed firms is
higher than that in non-finan-
cially distressed firms.
Voluntary Disclosure and Size of
the Firm
An association between disclo-
sure and size of firm is expected in
Indonesia if the following conditions
apply. First, bigger size in firms is
positively correlated with greater num-
bers of capital providers. Disclosure
may increase with firm size because
claimants demand greater disclosure.
Second, there may be a fixed compo-
nent of disclosure costs so that smaller
firms may be reluctant to disclose them
frequently. In addition, the cost of dis-
seminating information may be higher
for small firms because the news me-
dia are more likely to carry stories
about large firms, and security ana-
lysts too are more likely to attend their
meetings (O’Flaherty 1984). Lang and
Lundholm (1993) support the hypoth-
esis that the analysts’ rating increases
with firm size, but provide no evi-
dence related to disclosure cost. Their
study reveals that more disclosure is
found in large firms than in small firms,
suggesting that there may be a fixed
component of disclosure cost. Accord-
ingly, the cost per unit of size should
decrease. Third, another possible ex-
planation comes from the transaction
cost hypothesis. Under this hypoth-
esis, disclosure will increase with firm
size because the incentives for private
information acquisition are greater for
large firms where the profit of trading
on private information is higher (King
et al. 1990).
The above cases suggest higher
disclosure with bigger sized firms.
Consistent with these arguments, a
positive relationship between firm size
and voluntary disclosure has been iden-
tified in many studies in U.S. setting
(Firth 1979; Lang and Lundholm 1993,
among others), Sweden (Cooke 1989),
New Zealand (Hossain et al. 1995),
Japan (Cooke 1991), China and Hong
Kong (Ferguson et al. 2002) and Indo-
nesia (Susanto 1992). Consequently,
it is hypothesized that:
H
2
: Voluntary disclosure is positively
related to the firm size.
Voluntary Disclosure and
Performance Variability
If the variability of performance
measures the degree of asymmetric
information, the disclosure may be
associated with variability in the fol-
lowing ways. Higher variability of past
performance indicates higher
unpredictability of performance. Be-
cause the adverse selection problem
increases with information asymme-
try, disclosure will increase with infor-
mation asymmetry. In other words,
higher variability of performance leads
to higher disclosure.
Some evidence suggests that dis-
closure may increase when perceived
management information asymmetry
is high. Firms appear to disclose con-
siderable information because the in-
formation asymmetry between man-
agers and claimants is high (Cohen
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1992). Further, managerial earnings
forecasts have previously been found
to correct deviations between man-
agement and outsiders (Ajinkya and
Gift 1984). Lang and Lundholm (1993)
explain that disclosure might increase
with performance variability. Higher
performance variability raises firms’
vulnerability to legal action; firms may
thus increase disclosure to reduce it.
Their study confirms that disclosure
scores are higher for firms with a
weaker relation between annual stock
returns and earnings as the proxy for
higher information asymmetry.
In terms of future uncertainties,
during times of distress, firm’ claim-
ants encounter a higher probability of
bankruptcies. The condition is exacer-
bated with high uncertainty about fu-
ture performance due to the Asian cri-
sis. Managers, expected to have more
inside knowledge, may try to inform
the company’s claimants about the
current situation in the firms and any
temporary shock in the company per-
formance. Based on the association
between performance variability and
voluntary disclosure among financially
distressed firms in Indonesia, it is hy-
pothesized that:
H
3
: Voluntary disclosure is positively
related to the variability of per-
formance
Voluntary Disclosure and
Leverage
Agency theory postulates that the
separation of ownership and control
causes conflict of interests between
principals and agents. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) claim that agency
costs are borne by firms which there-
fore have incentives to provide volun-
tary information to reduce costs. More-
over, they theoretically argue that
agency costs will be higher for firms
with higher debt because of the in-
creased potential for wealth transfers
from creditors to shareholders and
managers. Thus, agency theory sug-
gests that the extent of voluntary dis-
closure will be an increasing function
of leverage.
 Empirical findings of this rela-
tion are mixed. Hossain et al. (1995)
identify a positive relationship between
leverage and disclosure for New
Zealand firms. Bradbury (1992) finds
a significantly positive association
between leverage and the extent of
voluntary segment disclosure in diver-
sified companies. However, Meek et
al. (1995) report a significant negative
relationship between leverage and vol-
untary disclosure for U.S., U.K., and
continental European multinationals,
although Chow and Wong-Boren
(1987) and Craswell and Taylor (1992)
find no relationship between leverage
and disclosure in their samples.
Financially distressed firms gen-
erally have high leverage with high
probability of bankruptcy. Transfer of
wealth from creditors to shareholders
and managers is minimized in this
situation. The association between le-
verage and disclosure can be explained
provided high leverage is associated
with high conflict of interests due to
greater numbers of creditors. In this
case, managers have incentives to re-
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lease more information. To examine
the relation between leverage and vol-
untary disclosure of financially dis-
tressed companies in Indonesia, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
H
4 
: Voluntary disclosure is positively
related to firm leverage.
Sample Description
Identifying Financially
Distressed Firms
To be included in the sample, firms
must satisfy several criteria. First, they
had an interest coverage ratio between
0 and 1 for at least one year between
1997 and 2002. The interest coverage
ratio is calculated from the Datastream
by dividing operating profit before in-
terest expense, income taxes, depre-
ciation and amortization with interest
charges. In this case, the interest charges
(Datastream code number: 2408) rep-
resent the aggregate value of interest
paid less interest received. The samples
contain nonfinancial firms only, and
40 firms meet this criterion. Other rea-
sons, for instance, incomplete data or a
missing series of annual reports (one
firm) and four firms in the samples
going private in the year before the
onset of distress, reduce the number of
firms in the samples to 35. The onset
year is the year when firms for the first
time have interest coverage ratio be-
tween 0 and 1, and conduct debt re-
structuring.
An interest coverage ratio between
0 and 1 does not mean that firms will
necessary become financially dis-
tressed, that is, have difficulties in
fulfilling the covenants in their debt
contracts. Debt payment can be made
from other sources than operating in-
come, for firms have many options to
obtain the cash needed to avoid de-
fault, including utilizing cash reserves,
reducing inventory levels, extending
trade creditors, drawing upon bank
lines of credit, restructuring debt pay-
ments prior to default, raising equity
and selling assets (Whitaker 1999).
The following additional criteria
should be deemed to determine the
onset of distress. The auditor disclo-
sure in notes to the financial state-
ments must indicate that the firms are
negotiating with their creditors to re-
structure their debts in order to avoid
default. Debt restructuring is defined
as an exchange of financial claims
which a firm makes to avoid default-
ing on its debt, including exchanges
such as maturity extensions (Gilson
1990). After this screening, six firms
were not supported by restructuring
news and the remaining samples con-
tain 29 financially distressed firms.
Most of the firms (16) plunged
into financial distress for the first time
in 1998 (55.2 percent). Seven firms
renegotiated their loans with their credi-
tors in 1997 and the remaining firms in
the samples rescheduled their debts
for the first time in 1999 and 2000.
Disclosure Index/Score
There are some approaches to
developing a theoretical concept and
operational measure of the disclosure
index. Patton and Zelenka (1997) sug-
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gest the following methods. First, the
index may be extended from a norma-
tive decision model against the useful-
ness of the disclosures. Second, it may
refer to the evaluation of analysts as
experts in assessing the quality of dis-
closure. Third, it may use certain dis-
closures which give a significant ef-
fect to market reaction. Finally, it may
be assessed on its fulfillment of par-
ticular disclosure regulations. Simi-
larly, Hooks et al. (2001) adopt three
phases in constructing the disclosure
index. First, they identify the potential
disclosure items which the scoring
sheet may include. Subsequently, they
develop a draft index after listening to
an expert panel. Eventually, they pro-
duce a final index reviewed by a panel.
In other words, the index is developed
through a pilot study, scoring process,
and expert evaluation phases.
In order to offer a list of compre-
hensive indices for financially dis-
tressed firms, the following paragraph
will review two chosen scoring indi-
ces produced by Botosan (1997) and
Webb (2002). By examining the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each
index, the proposed index may present
a more suitable and comprehensive
index for Indonesian financially dis-
tressed firms.
Botosan (1997) offers an index
consisting of 82 disclosure items, of
which 19 are only additional informa-
tion with no point score (see Appendix
B). She applies various studies of in-
formation needed by investors, accoun-
tants, and businesses to choose the
items included in the annual reports.
The main studies are: the study of  the
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (1994) on business re-
porting (the Jenkin Committee report),
the SRI International survey (1987) of
investor information needs and the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants’ study (1991) In detail, she
identifies 63 items of information cat-
egorized into five sections: background
information, summary of historical
results, key nonfinancial statistics, pro-
jected information, and management
discussion and analysis. She claims
that her index is an unweighted mea-
sure of disclosure level, except as fol-
lows. First, the quantitative informa-
tion is awarded one more point than
the qualitative. The reason is that more
specific information is viewed as more
credible. Second, projected sales and
earnings information provided by
multi-segment firms is weighted by
the fraction of consolidated earnings
or sales being forecasted. Third, if
there is inconsistency between the con-
tent of management discussion and
analysis and the information found in
other business reporting, only half the
available points is awarded.
The Botosan samples exclude
firms in reorganization under Chapter
11 of U.S. bankruptcy law, consider-
ing that it may differ from the norm.
Undoubtedly, the list does not include
essential disclosure for financially dis-
tressed firms, for instance, discontin-
ued operations or disposal impact on
current or future results, economic risk
and climate, business and financial
risk, inflation and currency transla-
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tions, debt covenants, and liquidity
issues (Webb 2002). The advantage of
the index is that it can be applied to
firms of any size. Her study is care-
fully designed to avoid introducing a
size bias through the following proce-
dures. First, it scores consistently for
single-segment and multi-segment
firms. Second, multiple points are not
awarded for multiple references to the
same disclosure item. The disclosure
index is purposely limited to items
which any size of firm could disclose
voluntarily.
Webb (2002) examines the qual-
ity of voluntary disclosures contained
in the MDA section of the annual re-
ports of firms facing financial distress.
She views MDA as a credible volun-
tary disclosure, since the management
voluntarily and considerably provides
a reasonably concise narrative for the
company’s stakeholders, and the audi-
tors must inspect it to ensure that it is
consistent with information obtained
during the audit. The contents of her
index are based on the U.S.’s SEC
1989 guidelines, a practitioner check-
list provided and validated by Hook
and Moon (1991, 1993), and internal
guidelines developed by large audit-
ing firms. Her index consists of 46
items and comprises the general busi-
ness, the results of operations, capital
resources, and liquidity issues.
The Webb index has certain ad-
vantages. First, it is particularly de-
signed for distressed firms. Second, it
takes into account divestment or dis-
posal disclosure as items to be consid-
ered in calculating the index. Lasfer et
al. (1996) provide us with evidence
that sell-off announcements signifi-
cantly affect the stock market in both
financially distressed and healthy
firms. In other words, the disposal
disclosure is important for investors.
Third, the index is thoroughly vali-
dated by the Botosan Index and AIMR
Reports for 1993-94. However, the list
considers only the contents of the
MDA. It assumes the MDA to be suf-
ficiently credible to represent the vol-
untary disclosure in the annual reports.
The other shortcoming of the index is
that it does not take into account the
corporate strategy, for instance, the
actions taken to achieve corporate ob-
jectives, and it also lacks projected
employee information and competitor
analysis.
In Indonesian case, the publicly
listed companies generally provide low
disclosure under the MDA section,
whereas the Indonesian Capital Mar-
ket Supervisory Agency (hereafter,
CMSA) provides guidelines for MDA
presentation. Herwidayatmo (2000)
claims that the Indonesian regulatory
framework is quite satisfactory but
lacks law enforcement. This
demotivates companies from follow-
ing the guidelines and regulations.
Alternatively, other credible sources
of information can be found in the
messages of the Board of Commis-
sioners, messages of the Board of Di-
rectors, and the notes to financial state-
ments.
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After considering the advantages
of these two studies, the present study
provides a list of potential voluntary
disclosure items by combining items
and approaches from both. It mostly
hinges on Webb’s index (2002) but
considers Botosan’s procedures (1997)
by designing company purposes and
comprehensive items from companies
of all sizes to measure disclosure qual-
ity in annual reports. Moreover, in
order to compile the Indonesian vol-
untary disclosure item list, the com-
bined items will be compared to the
Indonesian mandatory requirements.
In detail, this study applies 112
potential items of voluntary disclosure
developed by Botosan (1997) and
Webb (2002). Subsequent stages are
implied for measuring the voluntary
disclosure in financially distressed
firms. A list of voluntary disclosure
items identified by Botosan (1997)
and Webb (2002) is used as an initial
framework. Then the items on the list
are checked to see whether the identi-
fied items are mandatory. The result of
the procedure is a list of voluntary
disclosure items in Indonesia. Third,
from the time before a company is
classified as financially distressed to a
year after the onset of distress, its an-
nual reports are investigated. An
unweighted scoring system is there-
fore applied. One point is awarded for
disclosed items, zero otherwise. All
scoring procedures refer to the Indo-
nesian voluntary disclosure checklist.
A voluntary disclosure score is de-
fined as the ratio of the total items
disclosed to the maximum possible
items score applicable to the firm.
Therefore the disclosure score (DS) is
calculated as follows (Equation 1):
To investigate whether being fi-
nancially distressed prompts firms to
increase disclosure, the study employs
a few non-financially distressed firms
in the same industry classification as
financially distressed firms (Datas-
tream code), fiscal year-end and ex-
change listing as control firms. We
identify control firms by the following
criteria. First, the firms in the same
industry must have positive interest
coverage ratio in the examined years.
Subsequently, the notes to the finan-
cial statements should confirm that the
firms are not in debt-restructuring pro-
grams. 13 control firms are found out
of the 28 financially distressed firms.
However, they represent 65 percent of
the industry in the financially distressed
samples.
Research Design
To test the first hypothesis (H
1
),
this study employs the Mann-Whitney
U-test and t-test for 2 independent
samples at a year before, during, and
after the onset of distress, in addition
to multiple regressions which apply a
dummy variable representing the fi-
nancial distress condition. In order to
control external factors which may
increase disclosure level, the study
applies normal firms as control firms.
We use non-financially distressed firms
DS= (1)
The scores for items disclosed
Maximum possible scores
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covered by Datastream (2003) which
are in the same industry as some of our
sample firms at the time of the onset of
distress. Author uses Datastream clas-
sification because their classification
scheme is well-known and widely ac-
cepted.
Ideally, this study applies all nor-
mal firms listed on the JSX as control
samples, which consequently needs
the total disclosure scores of all nor-
mal firms from 1996 to 2001. How-
ever, the scoring processes for all nor-
mal firms in the sample period are
lengthy to complete. Further, prior
studies found a relation between in-
dustry type and the disclosure level
where the extent of information may
differ among industries (Cooke 1991;
1992; among others). For these rea-
sons, this study utilizes a few normal
firms as control firms that are in the
same industry classification as the fi-
nancially distressed firms.
The possible external factor which
may affect the level of disclosure is the
expected mandatory disclosure re-
quired by IMF and the World Bank.
During the Asian crisis, both institu-
tions were heavily involved in assist-
ing the Indonesian government to re-
lieve the distress. One of their sound
suggestions was to apply good corpo-
rate governance in Indonesian compa-
nies. Accordingly, many firms antici-
pated this by increasing disclosure
along with other good corporate gov-
ernance practices, namely, hiring in-
dependent directors or commissioners
and adopting good internal auditor
systems before they became compul-
sory. Hence, both the advent of dis-
tress and external factors may have
boosted disclosure level during the
sample period.
The following multiple regression
Equation 2 is used to test the hypoth-
eses stated above:
DS
t
 is disclosure score at the onset
of distress year, DISTRESS
t
 is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1
for financially distressed firms and 0
otherwise, LSIZE
t
 is log of total assets
at the onset of the distress year, VAR
t
is standard deviation of return on as-
sets over the preceding ten years or
starting from the initial public offering
year to the onset of the distress year,
LEV
t
 is total debt divided by total
capital at the onset of the distress year.
The Validity and Reliability of
the Index
The validity of our index is mea-
sured by three approaches: content,
contextual and internal validities. The
proposed index is a combined index of
Botosan’s (1997) and Webb’s (2002)
indices; each of which has been thor-
oughly checked for validity and reli-
ability. For instance, it claims to have
content validity since Webb’s index is
based on authoritative literature and
practitioner guidelines provided and
validated by Hooks and Moon (1991,
1993) and a review of internal guide-
lines developed by a large auditing
DS
t
= 
0
 + 
1 
DISTRESS
t
 + 
2
 LSIZE
t
 +

3
VAR
t
 + 
4 
LEV
t
 + 
t
(2)
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firm. It also possesses contextual va-
lidity since it is correlated significantly
(p < 0.05) with one well known mea-
sure of disclosure quality (Botosan
Index). Webb randomly chooses to
score her sample by using Botosan’s
(1997) index and compares her index
score to the Botosan score. Her index
shows the Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.307 (p = 0.046), Spearman
Rho of 0.36 (p = 0.023) against the
Botosan Index.
Botosan (1997) assesses the va-
lidity and reliability of her index in the
following ways. First, she uses inter-
nal validity by examining the correla-
tion between the score and firms’ char-
acteristics found in previous research
to be related to disclosure level. She
uses Lang and Lundholm (1993) as the
benchmark, since it provides the most
comprehensive analysis of the deter-
minants of disclosure level to date.
The result shows that, except for sev-
eral of the profitability measures, all
the rank order correlation statistics are
significant in the same direction across
their samples. In summary, her score is
significantly correlated with firm size,
the earnings/returns correlation, the
variance of stock returns, return on
equity, and abnormal returns for the
previous year and the security issu-
ance variable. In general, the results of
the correlation analysis provide evi-
dence that the Botosan Index is a valid
measure of disclosure level.
In terms of reliability, the author
of the Botosan Index applies rank or-
der correlation between the compo-
nents of the disclosure index, the num-
ber of Wall Street Journal articles writ-
ten about the firm, and the number of
financial analysts following the firm.
The result shows that each of the com-
ponents of the disclosure index is posi-
tively correlated with each of the re-
maining components, the total disclo-
sure score, and two other proxies.
In addition to the fact that the
basic indices which we use to con-
struct our index have already been
checked for validity and reliability, the
combined index will be assessed for
validity and reliability once more in
the following ways:
The internal validity is examined
by producing the multivariate analysis
between disclosure score and firms’
characteristics in Indonesia. The re-
gression results illustrate that the dis-
closure score is a valid measure. The
sign of the coefficients of LSIZE and
VAR are positive (Table 1 – panel A).
They are consistent with those reported
by Botosan in Panel B.
To check the reliability of the in-
dex, we reclassify our index categories
into Utama’s (Botosan’s) Index. The
combination of general corporate in-
formation, corporate strategy, and com-
petitor information in our index will be
classified in the background informa-
tion in Utama’s (Botosan’s). Financial
review category is matched with a
summary of historical/financial results.
Information about director/manage-
ment, employee information, and key
nonfinancial information are combined
into the key nonfinancial statistics in
Utama’s study. Research and Devel-
opment and projected information are
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Table 1.Comparison of Full Regression of Disclosure Score on Firm Charac-
teristics
Panel A: Current Sample Results
LSIZE VAR LEV DISTRESS
(+) (+) (+) (+)
Coefficient 0.031 0.135 -0.083 0.074
t-statistic 3.819 *** 1.386 -1.627 2.543 **
Adj. R2 39.5%
N 42
Panel B: Botosan Resultsa
MVAL CORR STDEV ROE ARET OFF INSIDE
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) (-)
Coefficient 0.602 0.069 0.157 0.061 -0.104 0.045 -0.125
t-statistic 8.43 *** 1.07 2.12 ** 0.85 -1.61 0.99 -1.89 *
Adj. R2 36.9%
N 169
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
The current sample size is 42 consists of 29 financially distressed and 13 non-financially distressed firms.
LSIZE is the log of total assets at the onset of distress, VAR is standard deviation of return on assets over the
preceding ten years or starting from the initial public offering year to the year of the distress onset, LEV is total
debt divided by total capital at the onset of distress, DISTRESS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for
financially distressed firms and 0 otherwise. MVAL is the market value of equity at the beginning of 1990;
CORR is the correlation between quarterly market-adjusted stock returns and quarterly earnings computed for
the five years preceding fiscal year 1990. STDEV is the standard deviation of the residuals from the market
model estimation of beta computed using at least twenty-four of the sixty monthly return observations in the
five-year period ending May 31, 1991. ROE is the after tax rate of return on common equity computed for fiscal
year 1990, ARET is the annual market-adjusted stock return for 1990. OFF is a dummy variable set equal to
one if the firm filed a debt or equity registration statement during 1990, 1991 or 1992 and zero otherwise and
INSIDE is the number of shares held by officers, directors and 10 percent principal stockholders reported in
the December 1990 edition of Spectrum 6, divided by the number of common shares outstanding.
aSource: Botosan (1995: 45)
classified as projected information.
Finally, management discussion and
analysis is in the same title category.
There are three categories which do
not fit any Botosan classification. Ac-
quisitions and Disposals, Capital Re-
sources, Liquidity Information Cat-
egories are excluded from reclassifi-
cation, since the items are mainly de-
rived from Webb’s Index (2002) and
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do not fit any Botosan categories. Table
2 provides the comparisons of the score
with Utama (2003)’s. They are similar
in many ways. The most often dis-
closed information is the summary of
financial performance, and the least
disclosed category is the projected in-
formation. The overall scores are
around 40 percent both in our score
and Utama’s.
Results and Discussion
In order to provide a systematic
way of linking the specific research
objectives and the results of the study,
this below subsection is organized as
follows: each subsection will initially
state each specific research objective,
then it will present the summary of the
results, and finally, it will be discussed.
Voluntary Disclosure Level of
Financially Distressed Firms in In-
donesia. The first specific research
objective of the study is to measure
voluntary disclosure level in the an-
nual reports of financially distressed
companies in Indonesia. The study
demonstrates that Indonesian finan-
cially distressed firms make voluntary
disclosures in their annual reports. The
disclosure score range is between three
percent and 49 percent with the mean
and median scores of 25 percent and
26 percent, respectively, at the onset of
distress. The percentage score is cal-
culated from the disclosure formula in
Equation 1 times 100 percent.
Table 2. Comparison Between Disclosure Score of Financially distressed
Firms after Reclassifying into Botosan’s Categories and Utama’s
(2003)
Utama (2003) applies Botosan’s Index to measure the disclosure score of a sample of Indonesian publicly listed
companies. The percentage score is the actual score divided by the maximum score in each category times 100
percent. S 
before
 is the disclosure score a year before the onset of distress, S is the disclosure score at the onset
of distress and S 
after
 is disclosure score at a year after the onset of distress. Overall score is the average score
of all categories. Value in parentheses is the rank of the category. The highest rank value [1] indicates the most
disclosed category while the lowest rank value [5] shows the least disclosed category.
Actual Score / Maximum Score (%)
Description S 
before
S S 
after
Utama’s
1. Background information 48.2 [2] 48 [2] 52.7 [2] 44.25 [3]
2. Summary of financial performance 92.3 [1] 96 [1] 100 [1] 84.9 [1]
3. Nonfinancial information 19.2 [4] 18.9 [4] 22.8 [4] 17.7 [4]
4. Projected information 3.3 [5] 8.1 [5] 4.3 [5] 4.4 [5]
5. Management discussion and analysis 24.8 [3] 31.3 [3] 31.9 [3] 55.7 [2]
Overall score 37.56 40.46 42.34 41.9
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Types of Voluntary Information
Disclosed by Financially Distressed
and Control Firms in Indonesia. The
second specific research objective of
the study is to investigate the types of
voluntary information which finan-
cially distressed firms in Indonesia
disclose in their annual report. The
most disclosed item is in the financial
review category, namely, the asset turn-
over or sufficient information to com-
pute asset turnover (i.e., sales and total
assets). Only one firm in the samples
did not disclose this information. Gen-
eral corporate information category is
in the second most disclosed catego-
ries. The information regarding major
products, segments or subsidiaries,
specific details about products, spe-
cific characteristics of principal mar-
kets, and the description of facilities
are in this group of voluntary items.
Competitor and employee infor-
mation are both in the third rank. The
competitor analysis disclosure emerges
either in positive or negative signs. For
instance, Charoen Pokphand revealed,
“During the year 1998, the agribusiness
industry was characterized by reduced
competition ….”(Charoen Pokphand
Annual Report 1998, p. 5) while Mod-
ern Photo mentioned, “1998 was
marked by very strong competition in
the photographic products business in
the domestic market. Nevertheless, in
the mid of these very difficult circum-
stances, the company still maintained
its position as the market leader” (Mod-
ern Photo Annual Report 1998: 11).
Most employee information points to
human resources development, such
as “The company has always tried to
pay attention to human resources de-
velopment. Employees’ welfare has
also become one of the company’s
priorities” (Apac Annual Report 1998:
18). Corporate strategy are in the fourth
rank, followed by Management Dis-
cussion and Analysis, Information
about Directors/Management, Capital
Resources, Acquisitions and Dispos-
als, Non-Financial Information, Pro-
jected Information, Liquidity, and
Research and Development Informa-
tion.
Panels B and C reveal the catego-
ries of voluntary disclosure at the on-
set of distress and a year afterwards.
The ranks of disclosure categories are
similar to those in panel A. The three
least disclosed categories are Projected
Information, Liquidity, and Research
and Development. This supports
Utama’s finding (2003) that projected
information is the least disclosed item
in annual reports of Indonesian pub-
licly listed companies.
The rank values of voluntary dis-
closure types in control firms show
similarity to those of the distressed
firms. It may be pointed out that while
a distressed firm may have more de-
tailed information than does a non-
distressed firm, it does not disclose
different categories of information.
Some disclosures are difficult for In-
donesian firms to provide, such as pro-
jected information, research and de-
velopment, and liquidity. In develop-
ing countries such as Indonesia, firms
have many barriers to forecasting.
Unavailability of industry data, incon-
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sistent government policy, and other
political factors are common factors in
this regard. In addition, with high eco-
nomic uncertainty during the crisis,
most firms are unable to provide fore-
casts. The low score in Research and
Development and Liquidity catego-
ries may reflect the unwillingness of
the firm to publicize confidential in-
formation.
Voluntary Disclosure and the
Tested Variables. The third specific
research objective of the study is to test
four hypotheses. Panel A in Table 3
presents the Mann-Whitney U- and t-
tests (Panel B) for two independent
samples comparing the level of infor-
mation between 29 financially dis-
tressed and 13 non-financially dis-
tressed firms at a year before, during,
Table 3. Comparing Voluntary Disclosure Between Financially Distressed
and Non-financially Distressed Firms
DS is the sum of the total points awarded in each of the thirteen disclosure categories. DISTRESS indicates
financially distressed firms while NONDISTRESS indicates non-financially distressed firms. The negative Z-
statistics indicate that the rank sums are lower than their expected values. The Null Hypothesis is DS
DISTRESS does not tend to be more than DS NONDISTRESS. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; **
Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A: The Mann-Whitney U Tests Between 2 Groups
Year Group* n Mean Sum of Ranks Z p-value
Ranks Rank (1-tailed)
Before 0 13 16.38 213 -1.812 0.035 **
1 29 23.79 690
Onset 0 12 12.33 148 -2.896 0.002 ***
1 28 24.00 672
After 0 29 10.88 141 -3.761 0.000 ***
1 13 26.26 761
Panel B: The Two Sample t-Tests
Year Group* n t p-value (1-tailed )
Before 1 29 1.812 0.039 **
0 13
Onset 1 28 3.123 0.001 ***
0 12
After 1 29 4.584 0.000 ***
0 13
*Grouping Variable: GROUP 1 for financially distressed firms, 0 for non-financially distressed
firms.
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and after the onset of distress. The
results present significant evidence that
financially distressed firms disclose
more than do non-financially distressed
firms. However, the results indicate
that the financially distressed firms
disclose more than do the non-finan-
cially distressed firms before they be-
come distressed. With p-values of test
results tend to be significantly stron-
ger, namely, at the onset of distress and
a year after the onset of distress, it
provides weak evidence that financial
distress increases voluntary disclosure.
The two sample t-tests in Panel B
reveal the same results as those in the
Mann-Whitney test.
Table. 4.Descriptive Statistics and Pearson [Spearman] Correlation Coeffi-
cients for Variables
Disclosure Score (DS) is the sum of the total points awarded in each of the thirteen disclosure
categories. LSIZE is the log of total assets in each related year, VAR is the standard deviation of
return on assets over the preceding ten years or starting from the initial public offering year for each
related year, LEV is the total debt divided by total capital in each related year, DISTRESS is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for financially distressed firms and 0 otherwise. Panel A
consists of 42 firms with DS at a year before the onset of distress. Panel B consists of 40 firms with
DS at the onset of distress. Panel C consists of 42 firms with DS at a year after the onset of distress.
Panel D consists of 29 financially distressed firms only at a year before the onset of distress. Panel
E consists of 28 financially distressed firms only at the onset of distress. Panel F consists of 29
financially distressed firms only at a year after the onset of distress. Spearman coefficients are in
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant
at the 10 percent level.
Panel A: Sample of 29 Distressed and 13 Non-distressed Firms a Year Before the
Onset of Distress
Item DS VAR LEV DISTRESS LSIZE
DS 
before
1.000
[1.000]
VAR 0.117 1.000
[-0.134] [1.000]
LEV 0.010 0.646*** 1.000
[-0.086] [0.278*] [1.000]
DISTRESS 0.275* 0.090 0.476*** 1.000
[0.282*] [-0.117] [0.533***] [1.000]
LSIZE 0.234 -0.194 0.122 0.323** 1.000
[0.260*] [-0.305**] [0.135] [0.308**] [1.000]
Mean 0.206 0.053 0.654 0.690 19.837
St. Dev 0.073 0.107 0.360 0.468 1.260
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Correlation Analyses
Table 4 provides Pearson and
Spearman Rho correlation coefficients
between variables included in the re-
gression analysis discussed below. All
panels present Pearson and Spearman
Rho correlation for variables in a year
before, during, and after the onset of
distress. In general, the correlation
between disclosure score (DS) and
DISTRESS is significant. The tests
also reveal positive correlations be-
tween VAR and LEV, LEV and DIS-
Panel B: Sample of 28 Financially Distressed and 12 Non-financially Distressed
Firms at the Onset of Distress
Item DS VAR LEV DISTRESS LSIZE
DS 1.000
[1.000]
VAR 0.104 1.000
[0.068] [1.000]
LEV 0.289* 0.198 1.000
[0.210] [0.197] [1.000]
DISTRESS 0.451*** 0.160 0.689*** 1.000
[0.463***] [0.095] [0.604***] [1.000]
LSIZE 0.545*** -0.166 0.446*** 0.333** 1.000
[0.467***] [-0.122] [0.410***] [0.335**] [1.000]
Mean 0.225 0.076 0.730 0.700 20.081
St. Dev 0.078 0.108 0.285 0.464 1.390
Panel C: Sample of 29 Financially Distressed and 13 Non-financially Distressed
Firms a Year After the Onset of Distress
Item DS VAR LEV DISTRESS LSIZE
DS 
after
1.000
[1.000]
VAR 0.132 1.000
[0.168] [1.000]
LEV 0.416*** 0.316** 1.000
[0.513***] [0.423***] [1.000]
DISTRESS 0.586*** 0.204 0.573*** 1.000
[0.587***] [0.303**] [0.618***] [1.000]
LSIZE 0.452*** -0.210 0.428*** 0.325** 1.000
[0.394**] [-0.144] [0.436***] [0.337**] [1.000]
Mean 0.219 0.090 0.726 0.690 20.190
St. Dev 0.069 0.089 0.402 0.468 1.379
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TRESS, LSIZE and DISTRESS. The
last rows present the means and stan-
dard deviations of the variables at vari-
ous years.
Regression Analysis
Table 5 reports the regression of
disclosure scores on firm characteris-
tics at various times. Regression (1)
applies samples consisting of finan-
cially distressed and control firms a
year before the onset of distress. Re-
gression (1) reveals that financially
distressed firms disclose more than do
non-financially distressed firms
(p=0.0356). It is consistent with Mann-
Whitney and t-test results. Accord-
ingly, the result supports the first hy-
pothesis. The regression also presents
evidence that VAR is a significant
factor affecting the level of disclosure
score with p-value of 0.0366. It is
consistent with the third hypothesis.
Regression (2) presents evidence
that financially distressed firms dis-
close more than do non-financially
distressed firms (p-value = 0.0156).
The regression also presents consis-
tent evidence that LSIZE is a signifi-
cant factor that affects the level of
disclosure score with p-value of 0.0005.
Therefore, they are consistent with the
first and the second hypotheses.
Regression (3) applies samples
consisting of financially distressed and
control firms a year after the onset of
distress. Regression (3) also reveals
that financially distressed firms dis-
close more than do non-financially
distressed firms (p= 0.0036). The re-
sult supports the first hypothesis and is
consistent with Mann-Whitney and t-
test results. The regression also pre-
sents evidence that LSIZE is a positive
factor that affects the level of disclo-
sure score with p-value of 0.0307.
The results of regression (1), (2)
and (3) show significant positive signs
of the DISTRESS coefficient which
indicates that financially distressed
firms may disclose more than may
non-financially distressed firms. We
conclude that the multivariate analysis
also gives evidence that the level of
voluntary disclosure in financially dis-
tressed firms in higher than that in non-
financially distressed firms. However,
they do not provide evidence that the
advent of financial distress triggers
financially distressed firms to disclose
more.
Regression (4), (5 and (6) apply
the samples of financially distressed
firms in a year before, during, and after
the onset of distress. Again, they show
that the size of the firm is a significant
variable relating to disclosure level.
Most of the regression estimates
show that the size of the firm is a
significant variable relating to the dis-
closure level. Positive signs indicate
that greater size is associated with
higher disclosure level. Further, the
coefficient of performance variability
(VAR) is positive as expected, but not
economically significant in all regres-
sions. These results provide no signifi-
cant support for the adverse selection
argument.
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Table 5. Regressions of Disclosure Score on Firm Characteristics
The table presents the results of linear regressions of Disclosure Score (DS) on firm characteristics.
LSIZE is the log of total assets, VAR is the standard deviation of return on assets over the preceding
ten years or starting from the initial public offering year until estimated year, LEV is total debt
divided by total capital and DISTRESS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for financially
distressed firms and 0 otherwise.. The sample size for Regression (1) is 42, consists of 29 financially
distressed and 13 non-distressed control firms at a year before the onset of distress, for Regression
(2) is 40, consists of 28 financially distressed and 12 non-distressed control firms at the onset of
distress, for Regressions (3) is 42, consist of 29 financially distressed and 13 non-distressed control
firms at a year after the onset of distress. Regression (4) consists of 29 financially distressed firms
at a year before the onset of distress. Regression (5) consists of 28 financially distressed firms at the
onset of distress. Regression (6) consists of 29 financially distressed firms at a year after the onset
of distress. p-values are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.083 -0.413** -0.173 0.065 -0.247 -0.163
[0.6434] [0.0123] [0.2426] [0.7913] [0.2310] [0.2426]
LSIZE (+) 0.015 0.031*** 0.016** 0.010 0.022* 0.018**
[0.1172] [0.0005] [0.0307] [0.4116] [0.0531] [0.0172]
VAR (+) 0.313** 0.135 0.092 0.316 0.106 0.185*
[0.0366] [0.1744] [0.4107] [0.1464] [0.3482] [0.0814]
LEV (+) -0.102** -0.083 -0.006 -0.099 -0.028 0.012
[0.0368] [0.1126] [0.8183] [0.2631] [0.7596] [0.6702]
DISTRESS (+) 0.061** 0.074** 0.069***
[0.0356] [0.0156] [0.0036]
Adj. R2 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.02 0.16 0.25
F ratio 2.553* 6.872*** 7.021*** 7.021*** 2.2815 3.6474**
[0.0551] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.1049] [0.0262]
AR 1.3596 4.8342** 0.110 0.714 2.555 0.247
[0.2700] [0.0144] [0.8961] [0.5001] [0.1005] [0.7829]
Normality Chi^2(2) 12.7*** 7.860** 3.457 6.005** 4.202 0.943
[0.0018] [0.0196] [0.1775] [0.0497] [0.1223] [0.6238]
Xi^2 0.373 1.817 0.686 0.177 1.472 0.645
[0.9100] [0.1247] [0.6827] [0.9935] [0.2461] [0.6931]
RESET 0.193 0.169 0.729 0.075 1.399 0.350
[0.6629] [0.6834] [0.3988] [0.7862] [0.2488] [0.0559]
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant
at the 10 percent level
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Conclusions
This paper investigates several
issues related to voluntary disclosure
by financially distressed firms in Indo-
nesia and offers a combined index for
measuring voluntary disclosure there.
It is basically developed from
Botosan’s (1997) and Webb’s (2002)
indices. After comparing the index with
previous studies, we show that the
proposed index and score are valid and
reliable. The average and median of
disclosure score are 25 percent and 26
percent, respectively, at the onset of
distress. The total possible scores are
77 measures of 13 different items of
information in the annual reports. The
most disclosed items are in the cat-
egory of financial highlights and gen-
eral corporate information whereas the
three least disclosed items concern
projections, liquidity, and research and
development. Moreover, the results of
this study reveal that the level of vol-
untary disclosure in financially dis-
tressed firms is higher than that in non-
financially distressed firms. The Mann-
Whitney U nonparametric test, t-test,
and regression analysis are applied for
various years. Consistent with find-
ings in previous studies, the size of the
firm appears to be a positive variable
significantly affecting the disclosure
level (Susanto 1992; Utama 2003; Firth
1979; Cooke 1989; 1991; Hossain et
al. 1995; Ferguson et al. 2002, among
others).
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